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Science, People & Politics, issue 1 (Jan.- Mar.), IV (2013) Page 7
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Given my thesis that the diplomatic rumblings between Argentina, and Chile, and Britain concerning Antarctica were more about competence to be effective territorial
stewards than about territorial aggrandisement, how can Bevin's memo and related Foreign Office and Cabinet records of 1947 and 1948 be best examined to throw
light on events? The answer is by allowing the dominant analytic back drop to change subtly during these two years. It is obvious that then, as now, there would
be more than one analytic context at any one time, and more than one time horizon in the lives and minds of those taxed with governance of the disputant countries.
Each was making decisions for immediate effect, and planning for futures. Each country was acting within different geopolitical contexts. To my mind there is a
question as to how effectively and explicitly each communicated the priorities of their own national concern to those with whom they were arguing. It might be that their
priorities could not yet be articulated. Lack of clarity would explain the exchange between Bevin and Mr Bianchi.
It is also unclear to me from the British records what part, if any, the March 1945 Act of Chapultepec [Reciprocal assistance and American solidarity] had on the actions
of Chile, Argentina and Britain in the Antarctic region.1 In view of Bevin's memo about sale of arms by Britain to Latin America it is tempting to interpret
Argentina's actions, at least, as related to its desire to remain free of US dominance as a supplier of arms. Bevin wrote,
Argentina in particular will do everything
in her power to avoid being tied exclusively to American production [of arms],..."
Yet in the same document Bevin wrote,
"The latest available information suggests the Antarctic dispute will become the subject of international discussion under American auspices,..."
The open question in my
mind concerns whether military needs, or the geophysics of the region already, in the days before knowledge of plate tectonics, and before the International Geophysical Year
or Transatarctic Expedition had been thought of, were driving events.
Secondly for analysis, for each document of record one needs to ask who had access to its content, and
what responsibility each with access had2..
Thirdly, the Second World War was a common baseline with consequences of as much immediacy to those living through 1945 to 1957 as the financial crisis which began in
2008 has for us in 2013. Immersion, as anyone with pretension to being an historian of the second half of the twentieth century must have, in news reels, photographs, museums,
ships logs and government records of the war waged on every continent but Antarctica gives only the tiniest insight into the exhaustion which must have weighed on the leaders
emerging from that conflict.
Where did the power lie?
In Britain then, as now, the Cabinet held to account by Parliament was where responsibility lay. Global rather than hemispheric, regional or bilateral thinking
still predominated Britain's outlook. Via decolonialisation the World was transitioning from hegemonical relationships driven by Western European colonialism. But
significant pre-war bilateral relationships, as between Britain and Argentina, and Britain and Chile, existed, and continued via sterling balances into post war years. In
my analysis of the Antarctic problem facing Britain from 1945 to 1957, where the event driver is a robust exploration of competence as territorial stewards, the continent of
Antarctica comes to be used as a bridge for the transition, and with potential to be a springboard for what might lie beyond the ideological competition between liberal democracy
and communism. In the spring of 1948 that ideological battle was in its early days. For example, in March 1948 Prime Minister Clement Atlee had announced to the House of
Commons that communists, fellow travellers and fascists would be removed from posts dealing with State secrets3. He said also there would be no witch hunt.
Clearly, analysis of events unfolding in the Antarctic region between 1945 and 1957 would be helped by knowing who in 1948 would have had access to Bevin's paper on arms for
Latin America, and the links he writes of to Antarctica, trade negotiations and the European Recovery Programme, because by 1950 the Soviet Union had entered the
Antarctic debate, submarine technology was advancing rapidly, and wars of independence were brewing in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Other topics related to the Antarctic
region attracted less restrictive classifications, but had sensitivity which in the wrong hands [those of someone with a knowledge set able to assign meaning to their
content] could have damaged, or seemed to be damaging, national security.
Competing relevant analytic contexts for analysis of the Antarctic and sub Antarctic related
records of the British government include: trade (armaments, wheat, beef); geophysical; meteorological; diplomatic, in different geographic spheres of
influence; hemispheric security (both East-West and North-South); and Latin American political development. Geophysics and meteorology were then, as they are
now, critical to safety of life and limb, as well as to profitable and safe international trade and transport. In 1948 geophysics and meteorology were competing
for government funding for expenditure in Antarctica and the sub Antarctic4.
Each of the analytic contexts I have just introduced requires stewardship or Sovereignty exercised by a body responsible for governance. I would argue that arms sales as
a means of influencing macro economic monetary strategies - which is what was happening - means Britain's relationships with Argentina and Chile outside of the
Antarctic and sub Antarctic need to be viewed as Sovereign actions, whilst those within the Antarctic and sub Antarctic are the acts of stewards, and ought at the time by
their nature to have been perceivable as such to the ruling classes of each power.
Of the economic context for significant arms sales to Argentina Bevin wrote on 4th April
19485,
"It is of course desirable that we should do nothing in this matter which would prejudice E.R.P. [European Recovery Programme]. It is however,[sic] impossible to
avoid raising this [arms sales for Latin America] issue now. The representative of Gloster Aircraft Ltd. arrived in B.A. some weeks ago and is still there trying to conclude
a contract for 200 Meteors6 [the appendix of Bevin's memorandum for the cabinet suggests that the 200 refers to conversion of an existing order from ad
referendum to firm], and hesitation or delay on his part would suggest to the Argentines at once that there was a government ban.7"
Bevin recommended to his Cabinet colleagues that there be no interference with delivery of aircraft under existing contracts. His argument was that Mr Marshall [US Secretary of State]
was not on strong ground in "pressing beyond a certain point his demand that we should forego hard currency earnings in Latin America". Bevin assessed the risk to regional stability
and British colonies which sale of the arms would pose would be minimal, because of the limited range the fighters could fly before refuelling7.
At the time of
this memo all of the elements of the Antarctic problem were then in place. I find it hard to imagine the post-War British Cabinets8, no matter how pressed for hard
currency, would recommend and authorise significant arms sales to a power with which the country was in genuine conflict, or with which it might reasonably expect to be
in conflict. It is also difficult to see how, if there was a dispute from Britain's perspective about territorial aggrandisement, selling jet fighters and bombers to
Argentina fulfils the Cabinet's invitation to explore a diplomatic solution. If stewardship is the issue in the Antarctic and sub Antarctic, the events, as they unfolded
at the time, make sense.
CLICK HERE FOR PART TWO OF THIS ARTICLE IN ISSUE TWO, 2013.
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