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Science, People & Politics, issue 1 (Jan.- Mar.), IV (2013) Page 5
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SOVEREIGNTY v. STEWARDSHIP
The ambassador's explanation did not placate Bevin, who called it a trivial amendment. Mr Bianchi considered the speech actually made, rather than as translated, could not be taken as offensive, and went on to say that the British press had been filled with caricatures attacking the Chilean president and Antarctic policy. Mr Bianchi told Bevin that the Chilean government was prepared to examine with interest "any suggestion for settlement of the territorial dispute by diplomatic means". Bevin, however, was not through, and he wrote that if President Videla was really interested in settling the issue diplomatically he should have said so before embarking on a highly publicised tour of the territory. Further, said Bevin, Videla's actions gave the impression that he was following the same line as "our common enemy", the communists, in believing Great Britain to be down and out. "We have recently fought a war at great cost to ourselves in blood and treasure in order to defend Western civilisation in the common interest. In the circumstances we are not going to tolerate such language from the Chilean president."1
This exchange between Britain's foreign secretary and the Chilean ambassador suggests to me that rather than portraying the dispute as a battle for territorial aggrandisement, the more useful analytic, research light to shine on the interaction among Chile, Britain and Argentina between 1945 and 1957 would be to consider that the government of each country was exploring the limits, in the new post-World War II world, of their competence for practical and implementable stewardship in the contested region, and by all means, from military power, scientific, meteorological, to trade, administration, diplomacy and policing the seas. Nothing I have read in the diplomatic and British cabinet record contradicts my interpretation. My proposed analytic frame makes the Antarctic Treaty much more comprehensible than if the dispute between the three powers is viewed as a territorial dispute.2
FROM LEGAL FRAME, TO POLICY STRUTS
The stripped down opening quote from the Antarctic Treaty displays its legal bones. Its ligaments - peaceful use, science, internationalisation, inspection, and peaceful dispute resolution - originate in political ideas in the years 1945 to 1957, from many nations. Those ideas segued into, and were compatible with, an international science project3 with sufficient intellectual breadth and depth to warrant inclusion in what, by any reading, is a ground breaking international Treaty. If international treaties can be viewed as consolidated acts, then the Antarctic Treaty is one of breathtaking aspiration, weaving jurisdictions together.
The political muscle and intellect needed to travel unscathed from 1948 to 1957 was considerable.
At the meeting at the Foreign Office, hosted by Ernest Bevin (1881-1951)4, on 21 October 1948, to discuss Antarctica, were present also Philip Noel-Baker (1889-1982)5, secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations; Arthur Jones (1891-1964)6, secretary of state for the colonies; A.V.Alexander (1885-1965)7 (Albert Victor, later the first Earl Alexander of Hills-borough), the Minister of Defence; Peter Fraser (1884-1950)8, the Prime Minister of New Zealand; and Patrick Shaw9 (1913-1975), an advisor to Australia's attorney general, Herbert Vere Evatt (1894-1965)10, who was in London for a meeting of British Commonwealth prime ministers.
Bevin opened the meeting, explaining that Chile, Argentina and Britain had now all sent warships to the Antarctic. The one ship Britain had sent could scarcely be spared from other tasks, and Britain did not want to maintain the ship in the Antarctic waters any longer than necessary. Further, he said, the gunboat diplomacy approach might be prejudicial to economic and trade negotiations underway between the UK and Argentina and Chile. One way out of the impasse, he told his Commonwealth and Cabinet colleagues, could be to follow a US proposal for an 8-power regime. It was a suggestion, he said, that was worth listening to. Under such an arrrangement Bevin thought that the Commonwealth would do well, because three of the eight powers would be Britain, New Zealand and Australia. He thought, too, that the support of Norway and France could probably be counted on for all the major issues. As for territorial claims, he had been advised that Britain had a good case, and he was prepared to go to the International Court of Justice. On balance, though, he was in favour of an international arrangement. "International co-operation would promote scientific activities for the common good11," he said.
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