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Science, People & Politics, issue 2 (Apr. - Jun.), IV (2013) Page 10 (Page 3 of issue 2)

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Antarctica and the South Atlantic, 1945 to 1957:
a British view from before the Antarctic Treaty System.

PART TWO
by Helen Gavaghan.

PAGE 10
The dualities I see, therefore, in Britain's relationship, particularly with Argentina in the Antarctic and sub Antarctic, are: competence to be stewards versus sovereigns of the areas disputed; and, the question, were Argentina and Britain enemies or friends? Despite all the military activity in the Antarctic and sub Antarctic by Argentina, and any factional nationalism within Argentina, I posit that at all times, even when in 1953 Britain despatched marines to oust Argentinians from Deception Island, the relationship was one of friendly nations, and from the perspective of both nations.

That the dispute from Britain's perspective was not about territorial aggrandisement, or a last hurrah of Empire building, is clear from the Cabinet minutes of 8th January, 1948¹.

"We had already informed the Argentine Government in our note of protest of 17th December [1947], that they should bring their claims to sovereignty in the Antartic before the International Court of Justice, and that His Majesty's government would abide by the Court's decision.²

If Argentina's case was as strong as the Argentine government believed, then the outcome to Britain's offer would have been enforceable via United Nations' troops. It's hard to see what Argentina had to loose. The offer was repeated twice more, and then an additional offer made to Argentina of independent arbitration. This last offer was made on 21st December 1954, and is particularly interesting³. An ad hoc arbitral tribunal might, with evidence, have stacked the legal dispute further toward Argentina's claims to the Falkland Island Dependencies via title from Spain and their geographical location as weather stations of importance to Argentina, rather than case law stemming from exercise of sovereignty over citizens and trade and territorial waters.

If Argentina's case was not strong before the ICJ or before independent arbitration, and the detail of Argentina's case is not apparent in the British documents I have examined⁴, it is hard to see why the Argentinian government didn't seek to negotiate some kind of Treaty of cession of some at least of the Falkland Island Dependencies. There was precedent from 1914.

Argentina had a strong hand. In a memo dated 10th May, 1948, and classified secret⁵, the chancellor of the exchequer told his cabinet colleagues in the context of a document setting balance-of-payment policy that Britain had a £20 million deficit with Argentina following the Andes agreement⁶. £20 million was a not inconsiderable amount in those days before devaluation of the pound against the dollar, and Britain wished to protect its dollar reserves.

Argentina, in addition to its peso, participated in the Sterling area, comprising sterling countries and those bound by the sterling exchange standard⁷. Britain imported commodities from Argentina, and in 1948 wanted to import coarse grain⁸.

When Britain looked south it was with the desire to get to the end of its economic recovery period with its balances of payments with the dollar and non dollar world restored, without having upset any of its major trading partners, or the Commonwealth, or the process of decolonialisation, having fed its citizens, and without loosing too many jobs. That, for Britain, was one dominant frame for the Antarctic dispute with Argentina.

The other dominant frame globally was the avoidance of a nuclear war. Argentina under Perón feared a Third World War ⁹. Did Argentina for some geopolitical reason wish to keep Britain as a military and administrative presence in the region, even at the cost of being in dispute over the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic region, at least during the 1940s and 1950s. Ernest Bevin wrote in April of 1948 for the Cabinet of Argentina's desire to stay free from US dominance as a supplier of arms. But if Argentina had won a case in support of Sovereignty of the Falkand Island Dependencies either at the ICJ or in arbitration Britain would still have been close to the region because of the Falkland Islands.

What actually happened in 1948, in the November, after the Soviet Union had moved to protect itself from Western spying on its radio communications, was that Britain, Argentina and Chile entered an agreement concerning the presence of their naval shipping in the region.

If you are interested in this topic see also: HERE

Science, People & Politics issn:1751-598x (online) and Helen Gavaghan©.All rights reserved.